Russia's military spending on the war against Ukraine has reached a record 5.9 trillion roubles
Russia’s military spending in January–March 2026 reached 5.9 trillion roubles. According to calculations by Janis Klug, a research fellow at the Berlin-based Science and Politics Foundation, this is 30% more than in the same period of 2025, when they stood at 4.5 trillion roubles.
The economist notes that the increase in the Kremlin’s spending is largely linked to a rise in classified budget items. Over the year, their volume grew by 43% to reach 4.9 trillion roubles, compared to 3.4 trillion roubles in the first quarter of 2025.
According to Russia’s federal budget for 2026, around 85% of classified expenditure is allocated to military needs. Total federal expenditure in the first quarter amounted to 12.8 trillion roubles, of which 38.2% was allocated to classified items.
According to Kluge’s estimates, military spending for the first three months of the year amounted to 2.5% of Russia’s projected annual gross domestic product and 12% of the estimated nominal GDP for January–March.
The economist noted that the figures may change by the end of the year, as spending usually declines in the second and third quarters. At the same time, he emphasised that the first-quarter result remains impressive in scale. In his view, if the current trend continues, Russia’s military spending could reach 9–10% of GDP by 2026.
According to Kluge’s calculations, military spending accounted for 46% of all federal budget expenditure in the first quarter. Furthermore, this amount was comparable to two-thirds of budget revenue for the same period.
The economist noted that due to new sanctions against the oil sector, the strengthening of the rouble and the economic slowdown, tax revenues for the first quarter amounted to only 8.3 trillion roubles. Military expenditure of 5.9 trillion roubles exceeded 71% of this amount.
At the same time, Kluge suggests that the record figures may be linked not only to an increase in actual expenditure. In his view, the Russian Ministry of Finance may have shifted part of the military expenditure from 2025 to 2026 in order not to exceed the planned budget deficit.
According to the economist, this theory is supported by the fact that, by the end of 2025, the federal budget deficit matched the planned figure, even though expenditure in the autumn exceeded the approved schedule, and in December proved unexpectedly low. Furthermore, at the end of 2025, the volume of classified expenditure was unusually low.
Kluge noted that if part of the rise in expenditure in the first quarter is indeed due to accounting decisions by the Ministry of Finance, then the actual rate of military spending in 2026 may be lower than current statistics suggest.
The economist cited advance payments under arms procurement contracts as another possible explanation. In his view, this could lead to a reduction in military spending for the remainder of the year.
He added that a more accurate assessment of the situation will be possible once detailed budget data for the second quarter is released, which is expected in August or September.
