Ukraine should formulate a common position on the elections to the Russian State Duma in the occupied territories
In the run-up to the elections to the Russian State Duma, scheduled for 18–20 September 2026, it is important to establish the state’s position in good time regarding the conduct of voting in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; the relevant decisions must be taken at the level of Ukrainian state institutions.
What are we going to do about the illegal elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories? They are scheduled for 18–20 September 2026.
Will we once again fail to make our case for not recognising the results of Russian electoral manipulation in the eyes of our allies and partners, as we did during the so-called presidential elections in Russia in 2024?
A joint strategic, institutional, diplomatic and military position could be formulated by the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Special Operations Forces and the Security Service of Ukraine.
The Kremlin is preparing and rolling out its electoral infrastructure. Traditionally, the electoral machine is centred on Sergei Kirienko – the first deputy head of Putin’s administration. The occupying authorities view Ukrainian territories as electoral zones where ‘convict’ voters are expected to secure a significant increase in votes for the ruling party at the federal level.
Let me remind you that Russia uses a mixed electoral system, in which half of the Duma is elected via party lists. The Kremlin wants to use the Donbas, Crimea, Sevastopol, and the southern parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to create showcase examples of hyper-loyalty to Putin’s party.
We must decide whether we regard the illegally established electoral commissions and the local campaign headquarters of ‘New People’, ‘United Russia’, the LDPR, the CPRF, ‘Fair Russia’ and six other nominal Russian political forces as military targets.
After all, Ukrainian UAVs could significantly help to disrupt the turnout figures that Kirienko will pass down to the occupation administrations. There weren’t many queues at polling stations in 2024 either. It’s not as if it’s petrol.
The Kremlin may try to rely on electronic voting in the occupied territories. In that case, our cyber forces could get involved in these processes. Although the federal authorities in the Russian Federation have already created problems with the internet, so our justified intervention is not particularly needed here.
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