Following the reform, the ESBU saw a decline in its performance in the first half of 2026

Recently, a friend of mine went to the library to look through business publications from the mid-1990s. After a few hours, he wrote: “You’ll be surprised, because I found exactly the same things we’re hearing today.” Endless talk about reforms, new faces, and the fight against corruption. There was even positive influence and technical assistance from experts in the U.S. and Europe.

Somehow, we’ve gotten used to living inside an information bubble that makes it seem as though all of this is unique to Ukraine, and that these challenges have arisen only in the last decade. But in reality, the agenda is exactly the same across the countries of the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa. Even the talking points are roughly the same. PR specialists and sociologists would call this a “communication frame” into which the imaginations of millions of people are herded so that they begin to view the world as a clash between darkness and light. The narrative goes like this: there are corrupt scoundrels whom the reformers—with their fresh faces—are ordering to step down, while the reformers themselves have clean hands, honest eyes, and the support of the European Union. Once you accept this frame at face value, everything else is simple. Any statements or actions by corrupt officials are pure evil, while the pro-European reformers are today’s saints, marching with the flaming sword of truth against the stinking army of darkness. Jungians would call this archetypal thinking, something like the belief in the struggle between elves and orcs in Tolkien’s books.

In reality, however, things are never black and white. It would seem that even back in the distant 1990s, there was talk in Ukraine of reforms and new faces. By now, all this nonsense should have grown tiresome. But no—every few years, society embraces new “elves” as a new hope. You know the rest. Over the next few years, disappointment and pain set in. And then, in the next election, the party of worn-out reformers gets thrown on the scrapheap, while society applauds yet another “new face” promising reforms and the fight against corruption. You might say, isn’t it time to draw conclusions and start doing things differently? But it turns out that archetypal thinking and communication frames are more powerful than human reasoning, because they tap into the deepest layers of the subconscious. So they’ll keep working.

Is there a way to break out of this vicious cycle? Of course there is. We can understand a great deal as soon as we start analyzing the actual numbers and facts. Since I’m an economic journalist, the discussion will focus on money.

I’d like to share with you some new statistics on the Economic Security Bureau’s (ESBU) achievements during the first half of 2026. Please draw your own conclusions.

The data presented will be particularly interesting given the remarkable activity of the reformers. If you recall, in 2023–24, certain activists, lawmakers, and anti-corruption advocates began pushing the idea of “relaunching” the ESBU. By this term, they meant appointing a new head and conducting personnel purges within the Bureau with the involvement of foreigners. The reform was enshrined in a law that was actively promoted by lawmakers such as Danylo Getmantsev, Yaroslav Zheleznyak, and Anastasia Radina.

https://suspilne.media/772491-rada-uhvalila-zakon-pro.../

You can find the actual bill they were promoting here. They pushed it from January through July 2024. They promised that with a little tweaking, everything would start working as it should.

https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/43595

At the time, voices were raised—particularly from the Verkhovna Rada’s Main Scientific and Expert Directorate—arguing that appointing a new head and conducting vetting were by no means a guarantee of effectiveness. But these voices were ignored, and under the slogan “at the EU’s request,” the law was pushed through anyway. Later, using the same scheme, a “reform” of the Customs Service was rammed through the Rada.

Prior to that, there was the disastrous “reform” of ARMA, after which nothing changed in the agency’s operations except for its leadership and the feedback from activists (who are now clearly satisfied). This is not surprising, as many previous “reforms” led only to personnel purges, but not to improvements in the quality of work. Here are some classic examples: this is exactly what happened in the courts and the prosecutor’s office, resulting in a brain drain and disruptions to the agencies’ operations. I’d also like to remind you of the 2021 reform of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). As for the rhetoric, it was international partners and Ukrainian reformers who actively pushed for the importance of reform. Officially, they wanted to narrow the SBU’s scope to that of a traditional intelligence agency, rather than a jack-of-all-trades law enforcement body. Among the reform ideas were reducing staff numbers and strengthening public oversight. Perhaps all of this was correct, but from today’s perspective, it looks a bit troubling—as does the fact that Mariana Bezuhla was the one driving this effort in parliament. And now, MPs Zheleznyak and Radina are pushing through a “reform” of the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) using the same procedure.

It appears that someone is fighting for control over law enforcement agencies, and that is what matters most—not effectiveness.

It turns out that this data will allow us to assess the results of the ESBU reform. It will also enable us to draw certain conclusions about whether changing just a few things—as the reformers promised—is really enough to fix the situation.

You’ll probably be interested to see what I’ve seen. Here are the real results of the ESBU reform.
------------

WHAT THE REFORMERS PROMISED

In August 2025, Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi was appointed head of the ESBU. Six months later, he gave a policy interview to the publication “Censor.” The new head of the Bureau identified the main shadow schemes causing losses to Ukraine’s budget:

“Counterfeit goods and the illegal trade in excise goods—approximately 50 billion per year. Violations of customs regulations, export and import operations, and smuggling—approximately 150 billion hryvnias. Activities of money-laundering and transit centers—40–50 billion hryvnias. Tax evasion related to ‘off-the-books’ wages and the use of sole proprietorships as a tool amounts to another 250 billion hryvnias or so; some say 300... The ESBU must, in close coordination with other agencies, ensure that this “shadow economy”—hundreds of billions of hryvnias—ends up in the budget.”

https://censor.net/.../interv-yu-dyrektora-byuro...

One could say this is the ESBU’s mission. In exchange for shutting down these schemes, the Bureau receives approximately 4 billion hryvnias in funding from the state budget.

Is the BEB delivering results?

------------

INDICATOR 1. SELECTIVE VETTING INSTEAD OF REAL IMPROVEMENT

To operate effectively, a law enforcement agency needs staff. The Law “On the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine” provides for a staff of 4,000 employees. But at the start of the reform, there weren’t even half that number.

“Clear deadlines have been set. Eighteen months for the restructuring, for the commission to appoint the director, and for the re-evaluation of all personnel… That’s exactly the amount of time needed to conduct a proper, high-quality re-evaluation of thousands of people,” said MP Zheleznyak after the law was approved.

The deadline was set for early 2026. Tectonic shifts have taken place in the workforce. The Bureau’s current total staffing level stands at a catastrophic 27% of the level mandated by law.

I would also like to point out that by no means all employees are productive. Within the ESBU, investigations are conducted by detectives. In the central office, there are 107 out of the 232 needed (a shortfall of 53.5%); in the regional offices, there are 200 out of 696 (a shortfall of 71.3%).

Detectives also need analysts to work effectively. In the central office, there are currently 59 out of the required 191 (a shortfall of 69.2%); in the regional offices, there are 48 out of the required 187 (a shortfall of 74.4%).

This isn’t even a disaster. It’s a failure.

What role have the “reformers” played here? A major one. During Tsivinsky’s tenure, the ESBU’s staff has shrunk from 1,800 employees to 1,069.

According to my data, 680 employees resigned voluntarily, and only about 50 failed the testing. I can imagine how it all went down. The appointed leadership summoned the employees and had a heart-to-heart talk with them. They said something like, “You’re not going to pass the selection process anyway, so you might as well resign on your own.” Or perhaps it was just like what happened before with judges and prosecutors. When they realized they’d have to answer questions from 23-year-old inspectors, many decided to retire solely to preserve their dignity. For the most part, it was the most experienced ones who left—those nearing retirement or those who found their calling in the legal profession. Those who remained were largely people who didn’t know how to find their place in private life. How did this affect work efficiency? I don’t know about the prosecutor’s office, but the courts became even less efficient than they had been before.

Interestingly, an additional 244 million hryvnias was allocated to the budget for the “reset” process. It turns out the money was spent on laying off 730 people.

It’s hard for me to say what motivated the 680 “Bebivtsi” to leave. On the one hand, I have no illusions that these were former employees of the Tax Police, with the corresponding background and mindset. But those who remained are exactly the same. So this personnel “purge” looks like a sort of selective vetting based on unknown criteria. Who’s left? People who’ve sworn allegiance to the BEB’s new owners? I don’t know.

As a result, the Bureau is 27% staffed, with regional offices at just 22%.

These are critically low figures that effectively make it impossible for a law enforcement agency to function as such. The benefit ratio of such a “reform” is close to zero. There is an ongoing exodus of qualified personnel from the Bureau (primarily analysts and detectives), who are, in fact, the very link that should be delivering results.

I find it hard to imagine what we’ll see as a result of the “reform” at Customs or, God forbid, at the State Bureau of Investigations. After all, there’s a significant difference between these agencies. If the Economic Crimes Bureau stops investigating, the world won’t come to an end. Ukraine has managed just fine without a separate agency for economic investigations. But if Customs revenue drops due to a shortage of staff, and the State Bureau of Investigations stops investigating crimes—that will be a real problem.

------------

INDICATOR 2. POOR PERFORMANCE HAS GOTTEN EVEN WORSE

It’s no surprise that the Bureau’s performance is so low. I’ve already written that the ESBU is the least effective law enforcement agency compared to the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) and the National Police.

As a reminder, here are the numbers of cases investigated per employee:

- National Police - 9.6 cases

- State Bureau of Investigation - 217.7

- Security Service of Ukraine - 3.9

- ESBU - 3.5.

Cases referred to court per employee:

per employee:

- National Police - 0.32 cases

- State Bureau of Investigation - 7.63

- Security Service of Ukraine - 0.06

- ESBU - 0.37

https://www.facebook.com/anserua/posts/pfbid02CziC6kkMfaS2fmJjG3WiukZtGNCERa8g8nvVffVreRQGAFhdfVv4GhUdqkfy2zXGl

But that was a comparison of the Bureau with other agencies. What about its effectiveness before and after the “reform”? Unfortunately, the situation here is also poor. I’m comparing the Bureau’s performance metrics for the first halves of 2025 and 2026.

Investigations:

First half of 2025 – 4,829

Second half of 2026 – 4,509

>> Result: an 8% decline

Indictments filed with the court:

First half of 2025 – 391

Second half of 2026 – 333

>> Result: a 15% decline

including cases under Article 212 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“tax evasion”):

First half of 2025 – 34

Second half of 2026 – 27

>> Result: a 21% decrease

And here is the worst figure. Losses recovered to the state budget:

First half of 2025 – 3 billion UAH

Second half of 2026 – 1.7 billion UAH

>> Result: a 56.6% drop

What’s more, the State Tax Service now costs the budget far more than it brings in. And this is despite the fact that the schemes mentioned by Tsivinsky alone cost the state 500 billion UAH per year. It would seem like an endless field of possibilities. But no.

The reason? I think, not least of all, it’s the “reform.” There are fewer employees now. They devote far more attention to passing exams and proving their own worth than to their actual work. It’s no surprise that the quality of the ESBU’s work has deteriorated.

------------

INDICATOR 3. HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES

I’ll use a very popular media approach—I’ll highlight only the high-profile cases handled by the Bureau. After all, the public is never interested in general statistics. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau has proven that people form their impressions of effectiveness solely on the basis of scandals.

>> Here are the high-profile criminal cases handled by the NAB in the first half of 2025:

1. January 2025. Exposure of a scheme involving the sale of excise goods (cigarettes, excise stamps) and diesel fuel.

2. February 2025. Notification of suspicion of tax evasion by highway construction contractors in the amount of 1.6 billion UAH.

3. March 2025. Uncovering a money laundering scheme by the owners of JSC “AIBOX BANK.”

4. April 2025. Uncovering a scheme involving fictitious purchases of firewood for the Armed Forces of Ukraine totaling 90 million hryvnias.

5. May 2025. Uncovering a scheme to embezzle 730 million UAH from PJSC “Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo.”

6. June 2025. Uncovering a scheme of artificial bankruptcy of a bank resulting in 600 million UAH in material damages.

7. July 2025. Uncovered a scheme to embezzle 2.2 billion UAH from PJSC “Carpathian Geophysical Works” through

geological and thematic projects.

>> Here are the high-profile cases from the first half of 2026:

1. March 2026. An illegal tobacco factory in the city of Uman with a turnover of 1 billion UAH was uncovered.

2. April 2026. A VAT fraud conversion center was uncovered based on materials from the State Security Service of Ukraine.

3. May 2026. Uncovering the “Marketopt” supermarket chain’s practice of fragmenting its business through sole proprietorships.

We’ve also seen a significant decline in this metric. It appears that the Bureau is currently not focused on investigating economic crimes.

------------

INDICATOR 4. IS THE BEB FULFILLING ITS FUNCTION?

From the very beginning, the Bureau was created to combat the “shadow economy.” Previously, many law enforcement agencies—in particular, the National Police, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), the State Tax Service, and others—had their own “economic” divisions. All of them were quite active. But for some reason, this had no effect on the size of the “shadow economy”; on the contrary, the more they fought it, the more it flourished. It’s reminiscent of corruption, you have to admit.

And now, the Economic Security Bureau has been operating for several years. Is it fulfilling its function?

You know the answer. It lies somewhere between “no,” “absolutely not,” and “what function?” So that all this doesn’t just seem like my own assertions, I’ll cite a fact.

According to media reports, partly due to the inaction of the Economic Security Bureau, as of mid-July 2026, the size of the “shadow” sector of the economy exceeds 700 billion hryvnia. That’s nearly 35% of GDP.

There are even worse estimates. For example, the European Business Association puts the figure at 40–45% of GDP, while Mr. Tsivinsky himself gave a more conservative monetary estimate of $14.5–24 billion per year.

https://www.rbc.ua/.../eba-nazvala-tri-shemi-kimi-tinoviy...

No matter how you look at it, the EBA does not account for even one-tenth of these volumes. In other words, the effectiveness of one of the most important areas of work in the Ukrainian law enforcement system is virtually nonexistent.

Here are a few examples.

------------

INDICATOR 5. “DETINIZATION” OF THE FUEL MARKET

At the end of 2025, Mr. Tsivinsky stated that the ESBU had identified 579 illegal gas stations, whose revenue—amounting to 18 billion UAH—was being laundered through money-laundering centers.

On the surface, this seems like great news. However, while they did uncover these stations, as of July 2026, the Bureau had blocked and dismantled only 46 of them—less than 10%.

At the same time, the ESBU carries out token seizures of equipment and fuel. Afterward, the organizers of these illegal schemes relocate the points of their illegal distribution network and continue their illegal activities. The estimated losses to Ukraine’s budget from such operations amount to approximately 100 billion hryvnia per year.

This is very reminiscent of the Tax Police’s methods, which for years were supposed to “defeat” economic crime in Ukraine, but for some reason only served to strengthen it. But wait—that was under the old tax police. They were corrupt, and they weren’t vetted by a commission involving foreign experts. Now it’s a different story. The Bureau has a new head, and the staff has been “vetted” and is supposed to work flawlessly. MP Zheleznyak promised that all it would take was replacing the head and re-evaluating the staff—and everything would start working. – Spoiler: it’s actually gotten even worse.

The Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU) is doing nothing to curb the activities of the “shadow” sector producing alcohol and gasoline, which results in losses amounting to tens of billions of hryvnias due to non-payment of excise taxes and VAT. In particular, the Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Lviv regions remain so-called “black spots” in the fuel market.

Furthermore, the ESBU does not monitor the activities of licensees in the excise-taxable products (alcohol) production market, nor does it verify whether they possess industrial capacity or use it in accordance with current legislation. Yet this would be the most logical step if one wishes to control the illegal circulation of alcohol.

The conclusion is disheartening. Efforts to combat the shadow economy in the fuel market and other excise-taxed products are purely nominal. It seems these efforts exist only in the ESBU’s press releases and Mr. Tsivinsky’s interviews, as well as in the vivid imaginations of the “reformers.”

------------

INDICATOR 6. “DETINIZATION” OF THE TOBACCO MARKET

I recently published an interesting news story. Despite the reformed Economic Security Bureau’s numerous “victories” in the media, the “shadow” cigarette market in Ukraine has grown.

https://forbes.ua/.../z-fabrik-u-garazhi-beb-zakrilo...

Recent studies have shown that sales of tobacco products in Ukraine are rising, and tax revenues from this sector are also increasing. However, this is not due to “de-shadowing,” but rather to… inflation and periodic increases in the excise tax rate.

According to KANTAR (an international organization specializing in market research and analytics), Ukraine’s budget losses from the “shadow” trade in tobacco products amount to approximately 30 billion UAH per year.

However, another estimate puts the figure at 80.7 billion UAH resulting from “shadow” schemes in the tobacco industry. As of mid-July 2026, these schemes look roughly as follows:

Stage 1. Companies operating in the tobacco industry without employees, production facilities, or excise stamps are constantly increasing their stockpiles of raw tobacco. Fermented raw tobacco is imported into Ukraine under the guise of unfermented tobacco from pre-selected importers. This results in evasion of excise tax payments. Incidentally, it is imported through the “reformed” Customs Service.

Stage 2. The raw material is processed into cigarettes and packaged in packs bearing the names of well-known European brands.

Stage 3. These products are smuggled (also through the “reformed” Customs Service) for resale in markets where cigarettes cost significantly more. This is causing considerable concern, particularly among our foreign partners in the EU.

or

Illegal products enter the Ukrainian market. As of mid-June 2026, the share of these products reached 19.8%. In fact, one in five packs of tobacco products is manufactured “under the table,” with no excise or other taxes paid on them.

Somewhere at the intersection of these processes lies the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU). Over the course of six months, the ESBU documented only one (!) case of illegal tobacco production. Meanwhile, the actual owners have remained beyond the Bureau’s scrutiny; only the “small fry” are held accountable, while production simply relocates to another location.

It turns out a symbiosis has developed. The existence of the “shadow economy” and the ESB’s successful fight against it coexist and even help each other. Only the tax “hole” is growing, and our international partners are constantly wondering how this can be.

------------

INDICATOR 7. COOPERATION WITH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE

A significant portion of shadow operations is funded by money spent on defense. In other words, this is where good old-fashioned corruption thrives.

In 2026, ESBU carried out only three operations aimed at combating the embezzlement of budget funds. During these operations, losses to the state totaling 76.3 million UAH were documented (in the following procurement areas: food—71 million, fortifications—2.7 million, drones—2.1 million). I look at these figures and recall that Ukraine’s defense budget in 2025 reached 2.6 trillion hryvnias. Friends, 2.6 trillion hryvnias for salaries, weapons, food, drones, repairs, and so on! Are you saying there are no violations?

Compared to that amount, 76 million isn’t even 1%. Apparently, Mr. Tsyvinskyi wants to say that there are no economic crimes in the defense sector. Although I’m certain that billions are “optimized” simply by involving sole proprietors in the distribution of financial flows. Monopolies have been operating for years in the defense procurement and food supply markets, and they’re almost certainly using schemes to funnel funds abroad under the guise of purchasing UAVs and components. I won’t even mention the infamous “17-hryna eggs,” which surely haven’t gone anywhere—they’ve just stopped being written about.

According to my information, the ESBU does not monitor the supply chains for equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including the operations of the State Enterprise “Defense Procurement Agency.” Nor has the issue of substandard ammunition, purchased at inflated prices, finding its way into the Supply Centers gone away. Meanwhile, existing monopolies have increased their influence over the allocation of tender procurements and the selection of contractors. Where is the Bureau in all this?

Furthermore, is the ESBU blocking the activities of money-laundering centers used to funnel money abroad, facilitate smuggling operations, and launder funds that have effectively been embezzled from the defense budget? For some reason, it seems to me that it isn’t. Because violations were found amounting to only 76.3 million UAH.

The conclusion here is very simple. Either crimes in the sphere of defense procurement have truly ceased, or the ESBU is not countering the embezzlement of funds. It seems to me we’re dealing with the second option. It’s strange, because the reformed Bureau was supposed to strengthen its cooperation with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) to jointly prevent crimes in the defense sector. However, this isn’t happening. Or perhaps they’re “fighting an invisible battle,” but aren’t telling anyone about it 😉

------------

INDICATOR 8. LEGALIZATION OF FUNDS FROM “SHADOW” ONLINE CASINOS

The gambling market is one of the most “shadowed” sectors of Ukraine’s economy, despite all the so-called victories in combating money laundering and reforming the gambling market.

I should note that these are crimes squarely within the purview of the Economic Security Bureau. The handling of multi-billion-hryvnia flows through illegal casinos—including Russian ones—is a harsh Ukrainian reality that is supposedly being combated.

What is known: According to analytical reports by international experts, in 2025, participants in the gambling market were supposed to pay approximately 40 billion UAH in taxes to Ukraine’s state budget, but in fact paid only 17.4 billion UAH. In other words, the state lost out on about 23 billion UAH.

Some work was done. During the first half of 2026, the ESBU concluded several agreements with suspects who pleaded guilty. But, according to my sources, the blame was “shifted” onto the so-called “pundits.” The key and decisive point is that not a single concluded case has resulted in the payment of billions to the budget! And this is in a sector where tens of billions change hands every month!

According to my sources, the Economic Security Bureau generally does not address the issue of using cryptocurrency to transfer funds from online casinos abroad, and—believe it or not—does not even verify whether the actual cash flows of online casinos match the figures reported in their financial statements.

In other words, the Economic Security Bureau does nothing to curb the illegal activities of online casinos. Thus, the problem isn’t even corrupt or incompetent employees, as “reformers” like Zheleznyak might imagine. The issue is that the relevant operational procedures—both before and after the reform—have not been properly established. Is this a coincidence?

------------

INDICATOR 9. HOLDING THE WRONG PEOPLE ACCOUNTABLE FOR CRIMES

Finally, we’ve reached the topic for which the Tax Police were endlessly criticized in the past. This is abuse of power. For example, when the illusion of vigorous activity is created, but in reality, only “small fry” are held accountable for crimes, while no money flows into Ukraine’s budget. In other words, this phenomenon could be described as potential misconduct by ESBU employees.

It is no secret that such things occurred during the era of the Tax Police. Due to corruption, the agency was ultimately disbanded several years before the ESBU was established. When the Bureau was being created, there were many warnings that without changing its operating procedures, a “Tax Police 2.0” might emerge. They say that is exactly what happened.

How has the reform, initiated with the support of MP Zheleznyak and European partners, changed this state of affairs? We have some data.

Since the beginning of Oleksandr Tsivinsky’s term, there have been periodic reports of cases where ESBU detectives acted in very strange ways. Let’s look at a few examples.

>> Example 1. The case of “TRANS LOGISTIC INTERNATIONAL” LLC.

Instead of facing actual punishment, a front person paid a fine and pleaded guilty to the illegal sale of fuel. A fine of 85,000 UAH was paid, and the fuel was confiscated and transferred to the Defense Forces. However, the company’s operations have not been suspended; it continues to operate and file reports. There are grounds to suspect that this lenient resolution of the situation may have resulted from ESBU detectives receiving improper benefits, but this suspicion requires investigation.

https://opendatabot.ua/.../132384790...

>> Example 2. The case of “IRPIN ALLIANCE BUD” LLC.

The Bureau accused the company of tax evasion amounting to 48 million UAH. But in reality, a front man reimbursed only 6 million UAH of the losses; the remaining losses were covered up with fabricated documents and “written off.” Could this have happened without the loyalty of the ESBU detectives? I’m not so sure. You can easily find references to this case via Google.

>> Example 3. The case of “Dunaiska Logistic Group” LLC.

It began with suspicions of tax evasion amounting to 19.6 million UAH. As a result, the former director paid 8 million UAH and was released from liability. No actual compensation for the losses was made.

https://368.media/.../ukrayinskogo-zernotrejdera-vikrili.../

>> Example 4. The case of the “Nova Zhytnytsia” farming enterprise in the Chernivtsi region.

At the end of 2025, following a lawsuit filed by the State Customs Service, a court found the company’s director guilty of causing 5.2 million UAH in damages to the state. He had organized the smuggling of soybeans through an inactive Romanian company. But the ESBU’s investigation came to nothing; the company’s director merely paid a fine equal to 50% of the goods’ value, as ordered by the Customs Service. A coincidence? Was there no criminal offense? Perhaps.

https://rozsliduvach.info/.../243203-chergovij_funt_cud...

By the way, I don’t rule out that in some cases, ESBU detectives might have opened investigations based on fabricated charges, as was once done by the Tax Police. I don’t rule out that, in some cases, the losses to the state might have simply been “fabricated.” But I also don’t rule out that the crimes were real, while the method of bringing those responsible to justice was rather “creative.” This calls for an integrity check on detectives who have already been vetted.

------------

Instead of a conclusion.

The question arises: who needs this kind of reform of the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU)?

I proceed from the assumption that reform means a government agency now performs its function better. Everything else—in particular, integrity, clean hands, and new faces—is just fairy tales for the poor.

Unfortunately, the Economic Security Bureau’s results for the first half of 2026 are disappointing. Despite the appointment of a new director and the dismissal of 700 “surplus” employees, the Bureau’s work has not improved. On the contrary, the quality of its work has deteriorated. Moreover, there are grounds to believe that disgraceful practices among detectives continue to exist, even after the “reform.”

One gets the impression that, from the very beginning, the Bureau’s “reform” was not intended to benefit society.

If we look at the “reform” itself, its absurdity becomes obvious. From the very start, the BEB’s problem lay not even in the individuals serving as tax police officers, but in the fact that they brought their old ways of doing things with them. Basically: find a violator, open a criminal case, and then—you know the drill. That is precisely what needed to be changed in order to stop perpetuating the Tax Police’s disgraceful reputation. New mechanisms are needed to effectively prevent crimes in the fuel, tobacco, and alcohol markets, as well as in defense procurement, and so on. However, I haven’t heard anything about changing those approaches.

Instead, part of the staff was laid off, and the staffing shortfall has only grown. The Bureau’s effectiveness, which was already low, has gotten even worse. The only improvement has been in the BEB’s PR statements and, to some extent, in the behind-the-scenes reports of the European reformers. I suspect we’ll see something similar at the Customs Service, which was “reformed” right after the ESBU.

Given all this, a question has long been on my mind: Has a covert operation to dismantle the fight against economic crimes in Ukraine unfolded right before our eyes?

If my assumption is correct, this must be highly beneficial to certain influential groups—the very same ones that are making billions off these crimes.

So, who are these “reformers” really working for?

Original source: The author’s Facebook page