How Donald Trump decided to go to war with Iran
The first closed-door briefing at the White House
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House on 11 February shortly before 11 am. His visit took place without undue publicity. After a meeting in the Cabinet Room, he went down to the White House Situation Room, where he was to present a closed-door briefing on Iran to Donald Trump and his team, reports the NY Times.
Trump was not sitting in his usual place at the head of the table, but on one side facing large screens. Netanyahu took a seat opposite the president. Mossad Director David Barnea and Israeli military officials appeared on the screens. Also present at the meeting were Susie Wiles, Marco Rubio, Pete Hagset, Dan Kane, John Ratcliffe, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff.
The meeting was deliberately kept small in scope. Some senior officials were not even aware that it was taking place. Vice-President J.D. Vance was absent as he was in Azerbaijan and had not managed to return in time.
It was this presentation that marked the start of a series of subsequent discussions at the White House, during which Trump assessed the possibility of US involvement in an attack on Iran.
Israel’s arguments
Netanyahu argued that Iran was nearing the point where regime change had become a real possibility. He said that a joint US-Israeli operation could bring an end to the Islamic Republic in its current form.
During the meeting, the Israeli side showed Trump a short video featuring potential figures who could lead Iran following the fall of the current regime. Among them was Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah, who lives in Washington.
The Israeli delegation claimed that Iran’s ballistic missile programme could be destroyed within a few weeks, the regime would be so weakened that it would be unable to block the Strait of Hormuz, and attacks on American interests in neighbouring countries would be unlikely.
It was also suggested that street protests could resume within Iran, and that an intensive bombing campaign would create the conditions for an uprising. Among the possible scenarios mentioned was the opening of an additional front involving Iranian Kurdish fighters from the Iraqi side.
Netanyahu emphasised that the risk of inaction was greater than the risk of a strike. In his view, delay would only give Iran more time to ramp up missile production and strengthen the defences of its nuclear programme.
According to sources, the presentation made a strong impression on Trump. Following it, he made it clear that he found such a plan convincing.
Assessment by US intelligence
The following day, another meeting took place in the Situation Room, this time attended only by US officials. Before the President arrived, two senior intelligence officials briefed his inner circle on the conclusions drawn following the Israeli presentation.
Analysts divided Israel’s plan into four parts. The first concerned the elimination of the Ayatollah. The second envisaged the destruction of Iran’s ability to project power and threaten its neighbours. The third involved an internal uprising. The fourth envisaged regime change and the rise to power of a secular leadership.
US intelligence agencies concluded that the first two objectives could be achievable with the help of US military force and intelligence. In contrast, the scenarios involving an uprising and regime change were assessed as unrealistic.
John Ratcliffe, who briefed Trump on these assessments, characterised the Israeli regime change scenarios in a single word, which amounted to saying that they looked farcical. Marco Rubio was even harsher in his assessment. Ratcliffe himself noted that regime change was theoretically possible, but should not be considered a realistic objective of the operation.
J.D. Vance, who had already returned from his trip, was also sceptical of such a scenario. Dan Kane supported the view that the Israeli side tends to exaggerate the capabilities of its plans and presents them too optimistically because it needs American involvement.
Trump responded by making it clear that the issue of regime change would not be decisive for his decision. At the same time, he remained interested in strikes against Iran’s leadership and the dismantling of Iran’s military capabilities.
The generals’ doubts and internal disputes
In the days that followed, Dan Kane repeatedly warned the president about the military risks. According to him, a large-scale campaign against Iran could significantly deplete American stockpiles of weapons, particularly interceptor missiles, which were already dwindling due to previous aid to Ukraine and Israel. He also saw no quick way to replenish such stockpiles.
Separately, the general drew attention to the difficulty of controlling the Strait of Hormuz and the risk of it being blocked by Iran. At the same time, Trump believed that the Iranian regime would make concessions before the situation reached such a scenario. The president, according to those present, expected a short war.
Kane did not tell Trump outright that war would be a mistake. He limited himself to outlining the options, risks and possible consequences. Some of those present perceived this as if he were simultaneously presenting arguments in favour of different positions.
There was no unity within Trump’s inner circle. Pete Hagset was the figure in the administration most in favour of a military campaign. Marco Rubio was far more cautious about the idea. He did not believe Iran was prepared to agree to a negotiated settlement, but nevertheless leaned more towards continuing maximum pressure rather than a full-scale war. At the same time, he did not attempt to persuade the president to abandon the operation.
Susie Wiles also had concerns about a new conflict in the Middle East, but was not in the habit of intervening forcefully in military discussions during general meetings. She believed it was more important for Trump to hear the assessments of those directly responsible for security and intelligence. At the same time, according to sources, she told colleagues that she feared the US being drawn into yet another war in the region and the possible consequences for fuel prices in the run-up to the mid-term elections.
The biggest opponent of war
J.D. Vance expressed the greatest concern about the prospect of war. According to those he spoke to, it was he who, within Trump’s inner circle, tried hardest to prevent a full-scale conflict.
Vance had built his political career on criticising precisely this type of American military intervention. He believed that a war with Iran would be a massive drain on resources and would be extremely costly.
His position did not amount to complete pacifism. Previously, he had supported a limited punitive strike. But a war aimed at regime change, in his view, would be a disaster. He argued either against strikes altogether, or, if the president did decide to go ahead, for a short and maximally powerful operation that would yield a swift result.
During the discussions, Vance warned Trump of potential regional chaos, heavy human casualties, the risk of a split within the president’s political coalition, and the perception that such a decision would constitute a betrayal of the promise not to drag the country into new wars.
He also drew attention to the issue of ammunition and the fact that no one could accurately predict how Iran would react in a situation where the regime’s survival was at stake. He cited the Strait of Hormuz as another key risk, as blocking it would hit the US domestic market due to a surge in fuel prices.
New intelligence and diplomatic contacts
In late February, the US and Israel discussed new intelligence that significantly accelerated events. The intelligence suggested that the Ayatollah was due to gather on the ground with other key regime figures, creating a brief window for an air strike against the Iranian leadership.
Despite this, Trump gave Iran another chance at a deal that would block the path to nuclear weapons. The diplomatic process also gave the US time to deploy additional military resources to the Middle East.
That same week, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff phoned from Geneva following further talks with Iranian representatives. After three rounds of negotiations in Oman and Switzerland, they concluded that some sort of agreement could probably be reached, but it would take months.
During the talks, the American side offered Iran free nuclear fuel for the entire duration of its programme, to verify whether Tehran’s insistence on enrichment was indeed linked solely to civilian energy. Iran rejected this proposal, calling it humiliating.
Kushner and Witkoff explained to Trump that there would be no quick resolution through negotiations. According to them, the Iranian side is dragging out the process.
The final briefing and the order to commence the operation
The final meeting in the Situation Room took place on Thursday 26 February at around 5 pm. By this point, the positions of all participants were already clear, and the discussion itself lasted about an hour and a half.
Trump sat in his usual place at the head of the table. To his right were J.D. Vance, alongside Suzy Wiles, John Ratcliffe, White House legal adviser David Warrington and communications director Stephen Chung. Opposite them sat press secretary Caroline Levitt, Dan Kane, Pete Hagset and Marco Rubio.
Not even those officials who would have to deal with the potential consequences for the oil market were included in the inner circle, notably Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Energy Secretary Chris Wright. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard was also absent from the meeting.
The President opened the meeting by saying he wanted to hear what the options were. After the strike plan had been outlined, he invited everyone to speak in turn.
J.D. Vance told the President that he thought it was a bad idea, but if the decision were made, he would support it.
Susie Wiles replied that if the President considered this step necessary for US national security, he should proceed.
John Ratcliffe did not express a clear position for or against, but reported new intelligence regarding a possible meeting of the Iranian leadership at the Ayatollah’s residence in Tehran. He also said that regime change was possible, depending on how exactly it was defined. If it meant merely the elimination of the Supreme Leader, then it might be achievable.
David Warrington noted that, in a legal sense, the option under consideration is permissible. When Trump asked for his personal opinion, he replied that he knew an American soldier whom Iran had killed many years ago, and therefore takes this issue very personally. In his view, if Israel intends to act anyway, the US should also participate.
Stephen Chung outlined the potential reputational consequences for the administration. He reminded them that Trump had run on an anti-war platform and that the public had not voted for a new conflict abroad. He also raised the question of how to explain a departure from the administration’s previous statements following the June strikes on Iran.
Caroline Levitt replied that this was the President’s decision, and the communications team would do everything possible to manage it in the media landscape.
Pete Hagset stated that Iran would have to be dealt with anyway, so it might as well be done now. Dan Kane again outlined the risks and consequences for weapons stockpiles, without offering a political assessment, but confirming that the army would carry out the order if the president gave it.
Marco Rubio articulated his position more clearly. He said that if the aim is regime change or an uprising, then this should not be done. But if the aim is to destroy Iran’s missile programme, then such a goal can be achieved.
After that, everyone effectively left the final decision to the president. According to sources, they had seen that Trump had previously taken risky decisions and emerged victorious, so no one tried to stop him.
In the end, the president said he believed action was necessary. He emphasised that Iran must not possess nuclear weapons and must not retain the capability to launch missiles at Israel and the region.
Dan Kane informed Trump that there was still time and that final approval could be given by 4 pm the following day. The next day, aboard Air Force One, 22 minutes before that deadline, Trump issued an order approving Operation ‘Epic Fury’ with no right of revocation.
