European chemicals for Russian missiles: how Cerdia’s raw materials end up in the Russian defence industry
This is revealed in an investigation by ZN.UA and StateWatch.
One of the key manufacturers of Russian missiles in this chain is identified as JSC “OKB Novator”, which is part of the “Almaz-Antey” concern and produces cruise missiles, including the 3M-54 “Kalibr”. It is precisely these “Kalibrs” that Russia regularly launches from ships and submarines in the Black Sea at Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure.
As the authors note, the Perm Powder Plant, which supplies rocket fuel, plays a key role in Novator’s production chain. A letter from JSC “OKB Novator” to the plant, concerning the fulfilment of a state defence order for the supply of these missiles, explicitly states the need to use foreign-made products due to the lack of Russian equivalents. Cellulose acetate is mentioned among such raw materials.
Cellulose acetate is a high-purity cellulose derivative produced using complex chemical technology and special raw materials. The investigation highlights that Russia lacks large-scale production of such products of the required quality and is therefore forced to rely on imports.
Although this substance is widely used in the cigarette industry, it belongs to a broader class of cellulose materials that are critical for the production of gunpowder and rocket fuel. According to documents in StateWatch’s possession, cellulose derivatives are used in the production of a wide range of Russian weaponry – from the KAB-500 and KAB-1500 guided aerial bombs to the S-300, “Buk” and “Tochka-U”, as well as the “Yars” strategic complexes and “Kornet” anti-tank missiles.
How the raw material enters the supply chain
The article states that at least 30 tonnes of cellulose acetate were purchased from the European manufacturer Cerdia. The company is described as one of the world’s leading producers of cellulose acetate for cigarette filters, with facilities in Europe, the US and Asia. According to the authors, Cerdia’s website still mentions its presence in Russia.
A letter from Cerdia regarding the supply of cellulose acetate in flake form – the basic raw material for further processing – was discovered in the Perm Powder Plant’s database. Despite the fact that the plant officially has a complete technological cycle for the production of rocket fuel, documents, according to StateWatch, indicate its dependence on imported chemicals.
According to the authors, intermediaries play a key role in these supplies. The contracts feature A2 GROUP LLC, which acts as a supplier of foreign products to the Perm Gunpowder Plant. The minutes of the plant’s procurement committee meeting dated 14 March 2025 explicitly mention the purchase of Rhodia Acetow cellulose acetate manufactured by Cerdia, France. The maximum contract value is set at €840,000, with a completion deadline of the end of 2025.
The same minutes record the decision to procure from a single supplier – A2 GROUP LLC – selected following a market analysis. Thus, as the authors of the investigation emphasise, the document directly confirms that Cerdia’s foreign products are being procured for a Russian defence industry enterprise via an intermediary within the framework of a formalised procurement procedure.
Intermediaries and the tobacco trail
According to publicly available data, A2 GROUP LLC does not appear to be a specialist supplier of chemical products. The company positions itself as a supplier of electrical equipment. Despite this, it is through this company, as claimed in the investigation, that the procurement of European-made cellulose acetate for the Perm Gunpowder Plant is being processed.
In customs data, A2 GROUP LLC does not appear as an importer. Instead, cellulose acetate is imported into Russia by other companies, notably those linked to the tobacco industry – the key civilian consumer of this product. According to the authors, it is precisely these entities that feature in the supply chain to the Perm Gunpowder Plant, pointing to a multi-tiered scheme where import, intermediation and end-use are spread across different legal entities.
According to customs databases, from the start of the full-scale invasion until March 2025, products from Cerdia’s German division were imported into Russia to the tune of at least $7.3 million. The main recipients are named as two Russian companies – OOO “Gulbakhars Rus” and OOO “Sertov”.
As noted in the report, Gulbahar Rus LLC received Cerdia products worth over $5.7 million. The company operates in the tobacco sector, which is the main civilian market for cellulose acetate, and it is through this commercial channel that the products enter Russia.
At the same time, the authors identify Sertov LLC as the key link between civilian imports and enterprises within the Russian Federation’s defence-industrial complex. The company received Cerdia products worth at least $1.6 million and, according to the data provided, has confirmed links with Russian defence enterprises. In particular, in 2016, “Sertov” concluded three contracts with the Perm Gunpowder Plant worth almost 11 million roubles, and between 2016 and 2018 supplied cellulose acetate to JSC “NIIPM” – a research institute engaged in the development of ammunition and rocket fuel and located at the same address as the gunpowder factory.
Ultimately, as StateWatch notes, customs and contract data point to a multi-tiered supply structure: foreign products enter Russia via civilian companies, after which they are integrated into the production processes of military-industrial complex enterprises through intermediaries.
Despite the sanctions, the authors conclude that foreign-origin products continue to enter via a network of intermediaries and civilian companies. Such a structure not only complicates the tracing of supply chains but also effectively ensures the continuity of arms production used in the war against Ukraine.
The article also features a comment from Oleksandr Frolov, a partner in the dispute resolution practice at the international law firm “Kinstellar”. According to him, the European Union operates a system of controls on the export of military and dual-use goods, which is intended to restrict their entry into Russia. If a company knew or ought to have known of the potential military use of its products, or failed to ensure proper control over their end-use, this may indicate circumvention of export restrictions and lead to liability.
Frolov also explains that international practice allows sanctions to be applied not only to companies in the military-industrial complex, but also to manufacturers of dual-use goods if their products are used in the production of weapons.
StateWatch has sent an official request to Cerdia asking for clarification regarding potential supplies of cellulose acetate to Russia after 2022, links with intermediary companies, and control over the end-use of products. As of the time of publication, the company has not responded.
